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Abstract 
 
When traders are uncertain on being informed and make effort to reduce their uncertainty, we 
would expect an improvement in both the welfare and price efficiency. By considering the 
disutility of the effort, we characterize the non-cooperative information game on traders' 
decision of making effort through a Nash equilibrium and asset price through a noisy rational 
expectation equilibrium. We show that making effort to be informed is harmful for social 
welfare. Also improving market efficiency is always at the cost of welfare reduction. 
Therefore, with the disutility of making effort to reduce the uncertainty on being informed, 
social welfare can be improved when traders make less effort, and more importantly, social 
welfare and price efficiency cannot be improved simultaneously. 
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21. Introduction
With increasing uncertainty and multidimensional information in financial mar-
kets, traders become more uncertain about certain information and need to make
some effort in order to reduce their uncertainty. Traders can benefit from being
more informative about the information when they make more effort. This however
also increases the disutility of their effort. Such a trade-off plays a central role in
traders’ decision making and can have important implications to market efficiency,
and social welfare. In this paper we consider traders’ uncertainty on being informed
about certain information and disutility of their effort to become informed in an
otherwise standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model (GS model) of noisy ra-
tional expectation equilibrium (NREE). We demonstrate that making effort to be
informed is harmful for social welfare and improving market efficiency is always at
the cost of reducing the welfare. Therefore traders cannot be better off by making
more effort and social welfare cannot be improved in more efficient markets.
In a competitive economy, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that information
efficiency of a price system depends on the number of individual who are informed.
When information is imperfect and costly, the more individuals choose to be in-
formed, the more efficient the price becomes, the less valuable the information is,
and the less incentive individuals choose to be informed. Therefore in equilibrium,
“the number of individuals who are informed is itself an endogenous variable”. In
the GS model, traders can decide to a pay fixed cost to becoming informed for sure.
In this paper traders are uncertain on being informed. To reduce the uncertainty,
traders need to make some effort. The more effort a trader makes, the more likely
he becomes informed. We examine how traders’ uncertain on being informed and
their effort affect their information acquisition decision, price efficiency, and more
importantly the social welfare. In particular, we investigate how traders’ risk aver-
sion and market information structure determine the optimal effort for traders to
becoming informed and what are the implications to social welfare and its relation
to market efficiency.
We first consider a baseline GS model when the information acquisition decision
is exogenous; that is the fraction of informed is given as a parameter. Consistently
3with the GS model, the price becomes more informative when there are more in-
formed traders. However uninformed traders are less willing to trade when the price
becomes more informative. In NREE, the aggregate risk faced by the uninformed
traders increases in the informed trading. Intuitively, more informed trading reduces
dividend risk but increases information risk for uninformed traders, which dominates
the dividend risk. This effect becomes more significant when traders are less risk
averse. The risk premium decreases in informed trading when traders are highly risk
averse; but has a hump-shaped relation to the informed trading when traders are less
risk averse. Concerning the welfare, informed trading always improves (marginal)
welfare in the sense that individual is always better-off for being informed rather
uninformed, however more informed trading always reduces the welfare for both in-
formed and uninformed traders. In aggregation, the social welfare is always higher
when traders are all uninformed than when they are all informed. Put differently, we
detect a sort of Prisoner’s dilemma situation. The social welfare would be better off
if nobody is informed. However, individual is rationally driven to being informed.
Therefore, at the equilibrium, the market ends up into a sub-optimal equilibrium
(from a welfare viewpoint) typical of a coordination-failure situation. In addition,
informed trading improves the social welfare only when price is less informative,
the supply is less noisy, and traders are less risk averse; otherwise, the social wel-
fare is typically reduced with informed trading. Therefore for the first time (to our
knowledge) we show that high price efficiency corresponds to low social welfare in
general.
The baseline model suggests that both price efficiency and social welfare depend
on the fraction of informed traders. When traders face the uncertainty on becoming
informed, we endogenize traders’ decision on their optimal effort to become informed.
We model a continuum of agents playing an information game inspired by global
games related to public and private information (see Morris and Shin (2002)). Dif-
ferently from classical global games, the strategy of the players is expressed in terms
of the probability of being informed. With this respect, our model resembles some
recent literature on probabilistic choice models (Mattsson and Weibull (2002)) and
classical results in information theory (Hobson (1969)). In Mattsson and Weibull
4(2002), an individual optimally makes an effort to deviate from the status-quo (a
reference probability) and change the likelihood of a finite set of possible scenarios in
order to get closer to implementing a more desired outcome. Given that the reward
is always higher for informed than uninformed, traders choose their optimal informa-
tion acquisition strategy to maximize the trade-off between a higher expected reward
of being more informed and a higher disutility of the effort. When individual makes
an optimal trade-off between the expected reward and the cost of deviating from
the status-quo, Mattsson and Weibull (2002) show that the disutility of the optimal
effort is related to the information entropy. The resulting choice probabilities are a
distortion of the logit model, in which the degree of distortion is governed by the
default distribution.
We incorporate this probabilistic-based trade-off mechanism into our two-stage
optimization scheme based, firstly, on a strategic information game and, secondly,
on a classical mean and variance investment decision problem. We characterize a
unique Nash equilibrium in the vector of probabilities of traders being informed and
a NREE in asset pricing. With the disutility being characterized by information
entropy, we show that traders’ optimal effort depends on their risk aversion and the
information structure. The resulting endogenous information equilibrium leads to
outcomes that are significantly different from the GS model.
Firstly, on the equilibrium fraction of informed, informed trading does not mono-
tonically increase in the noise supply. In fact, when traders are less risk averse,
they make more effort to being informed as the noise supply increases. However
when traders are more risk averse, there is a hump-shaped relation between the
endogenous informed trading and the noise supply. Traders make more effort when
the supply noise is neither too small nor too large. This effect becomes more pro-
nounced when traders are very risk averse. Also, an increase in informed trading
cannot perfectly offset the noises in supply and dividend payoff. Furthermore, with
an increase in the dividend noise and the informativeness of the information, traders
are making more effort to be informed. Overall, when the noise in the information is
neither too small nor too large relative to the noise supply and the unobserved noise,
5the information becomes more valuable and traders make more effort to becoming
informed.
Secondly, on the equilibrium implications for price efficiency, informed trading
improves price efficiency in general, but this is not necessarily always the case. It
depends on traders’ risk aversion and the information structure characterized by
the noise in supply, the informativeness of the information, and the dividend noise.
When traders are less risk averse, as the supply noise increases, traders make more
effort to become informed but the price becomes less efficient. When traders are
more risk averse, an increase in the supply noise at low levels leads to more effort
for traders to become informed, which however reduces the price efficiency. More
generally, an increase in the supply noise at high levels always leads traders to
make less effort to becoming informed, making price less efficient. Furthermore,
with an increase in the dividend noise and the informativeness of the information,
traders are making more effort to be informed, which however has different impact
on price efficiency. High dividend noise makes the price less efficient, while high
informativeness of the information improves the price efficiency. Therefore, when
traders make more effort to becoming informed, the price efficiency is not necessarily
improved.
Thirdly, on the social welfare, it is always low when price is more efficient. This
implies that improving market efficiency is always at the cost of reducing the so-
cial welfare. Also, when traders make effort to reduce their uncertainty on being
informed, it is always harmful to the social welfare comparing to making no effort,
which is underlined by the Prisoner’s dilemma situation in the exogenous NREE.
Therefore traders are better off by making less effort and social welfare cannot be
improved in more efficient markets.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We introduce the model and define
the equilibrium in Section 2. In Section 3, we consider a baseline GS model with
exogenous fraction of informed traders and examine the impact of informed trading
on aggregate risk, risk premia, and welfare. Section 4 extend the analysis to an
endogenous information equilibrium and explore the equilibrium informed trading,
price efficiency and welfare analysis. In Section 5 we explicitly model trading motives
6as a possible route to endogenous supply. Section 6 concludes and all the proofs are
collected in the Appendix.
2. The Model
We consider a static one-period model. There is a measure-one continuum of
traders, indexed by i ∈ (0, 1) who can invest in two assets: a risk-free asset with
a rate of return R > 1 and a risky asset with payoff D˜ at the end of the period.
Traders are risk averse with a CARA utility function, i.e., u(W˜i) = −e−αW˜i , where
α is the absolute risk aversion and W˜i is trader i’s terminal portfolio wealth. As in
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) (GS henceforth), the payoff of the risky asset is given
by
D˜ = d+ θ˜ + ˜, (2.1)
where θ˜ ∼ N (0, vθ) represents the fundamental information component of the risky
payoff, which is observable to the informed traders, ˜ ∼ N (0, v) represents the
noise component, which is unobservable to all traders, and d = E[D](> R) is a
constant. We assume that the risk-free asset is in zero net supply and the risky
asset has a noisy net supply of z˜ ∼ N (0, vz). Note that the supply shock z˜ can be
due to liquidity demand or noise trading. In Section 5, we model the behaviour of
liquidity/noise traders explicitly using endowment shocks. For now we simply take
the noisy supply as given.
In the GS model, trader can pay a fixed cost to be informed about the infor-
mation θ˜ for sure. Therefore, the information acquisition decision depends on the
information cost and the difference in the expected utilities between informed and
uninformed. If the cost is less than the difference, some individuals switch from
being uninformed to being informed.
In our model there is an uncertainty about how likely the trader can be informed
about the fundamental information and he needs to make some effort in order to re-
duce this uncertainty. In other words, trader i faces the possibility to be informed.
The more effort the trader makes, the more likely he becomes informed, and the
more disutility he has to bear. More explicitly, with a probability pi ∈ [p0, 1], trader
7i can be informed to observe the fundamental information θ˜.1 To increase his prob-
ability to be informed, the trader needs to make an effort. On the information
acquisition decision, the trader decides the effort he wants to put in place in order
to be informed. This effort is signalled by the probability pi, the more the effort,
the higher the probability. However there is a disutility associated with the effort,
c(pi), which is an increasing function of the effort and hence probability pi. There-
fore, trader’s information acquisition decision depends on the trade-off between the
expected utility to be informed and the disutility of his effort. Intuitively, in equi-
librium the probability of becoming informed is same for all traders, p∗i = p
∗, which
also corresponds to the fraction of traders to be informed λ = p∗. For convenience,
we denote type I as informed and type U as uninformed.
To characterize the equilibrium information acquisition, for trader i, we denote
by ωi ∈ {0, 1}, where ωi = 1 corresponds to type I and ωi = 0 corresponds to type
U .2 Therefore, for all i ∈ (0, 1),
P(ωi = 1) = pi; P(ωi = 0) = 1− pi.
Each trader makes a decision about his desired effort signalled by pi. The trader also
chooses his optimal demand xi, the number of shares invested in the risky security,
after knowing which type (informed or uninformed) he belongs to. Therefore the
objective of trader i is to maximize
U(pi;λ) = piVI(λ) + (1− pi)VU(λ)− µ c(pi), (2.2)
with respect to his probability pi, where
VI(λ) = max
xi
E
[
u
(
W (xi)
)∣∣∣ωi = 1, λ], VU(λ) = max
xi
E
[
u
(
W (xi)
)∣∣∣ωi = 0, λ], (2.3)
c is an increasing and convex cost function such that c(p0) = 0 and µ ≥ 0 a constant
parameter.
1Here p0 ≥ 0 is a reference probability, depending on the specification of the model, p0 may be
0 or a strictly positive value.
2We assume everyone starts off being uninformed.
8The optimization scheme of trader i is separated into two stages and solved back-
ward. First, trader i decides his portfolio choice x∗i given his type, that is the real-
ization of ωi. Second, by averaging on the likelihood of being informed and forming
an expectation about other traders’ actions, trader i strategically chooses p∗i , the
optimal probability to become informed; we refer to this stage as the information
game. The vector of optimal strategies, p∗ = (p∗i )i∈(0,1), is then determined by a Nash
equilibrium, while the equilibrium price P ∗ of the risky asset is determined by the
market clearing condition as in the standard noisy rational expectation equilibrium
(NREE)(Admati (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1987)). Note that the equilibrium
price for the risky asset depends on the fraction of informed traders, λ, where
λ =
∫ 1
0
I{ωi=+1}di.
Therefore, when needed, we will denote the price as Pλ.
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Before introducing a formal definition of equilibrium, we briefly discuss the struc-
ture of the two-stage optimization problem. Both VI and VU in (2.3) represent,
respectively, the expected utilities of the wealth for traders of type I and U , con-
ditional on the result of the information game.4 Concerning U defined in (2.2), it
provides the payoff for trader i related to the information game played by the traders.
Since each trader optimally chooses the probability of being informed, pi ∈ [p0, 1],
our approach is strictly related to a genreal class of probabilistic choice models (see
Mattsson and Weibull (2002)). In this context, a very natural choice for the payoff
of the game is the difference between the expected reward and the disutility from
effort due to the change in the status-quo (p0 in our model). We will specify in more
details the shape of the cost function c is Section 4 when solving the information
game. We now introduce the following definition of market equilibrium.
Definition 2.1. We say that probability p∗ = (p∗i )i∈(0,1), fraction of informed λ
∗, and
price P ∗ of the risky asset are in equilibrium if
3More precisely, we see in Section 3 that Pλ = hλ(θ, z) is a random variable, where hλ is a
deterministic function depending on λ.
4At this stage, we assume that individual traders do know the realization of the information
game; the vector p of probabilities and the fraction of informed λ. Knowledge of λ is crucial since
the price of the risky asset depends on λ.
9(i) p∗ = (p∗i )i∈(0,1) is a Nash equilibrium, meaning that for every i ∈ (0, 1),
U(p∗i ;λ) ≥ U(pi;λ);
(ii) the following consistency equation is satisfied5
λ = E
[∫ 1
0
I{ω∗i =1} di
]
=
∫ 1
0
p∗i di ≡ λ∗,
here ω∗i is the random variable associated to the optimal probability p
∗
i ;
(iii) the price P ∗ = Pλ∗ satisfies market clearing condition∫ 1
0
x∗i di = z˜, (2.4)
where x∗ = (x∗i )i∈(0,1) is the optimal investment strategy profile.
In the following section, we first turn our attention to the second stage of the
problem, solving for the optimal demand xi, conditioning on the outcome of the in-
formation game. In particular, we examine the NREE when the fraction of informed
λ is given exogenously. We then explore the implication of endogenous information
equilibrium on price efficiency and social welfare in Section 4.
3. A Welfare Analysis with Asymmetric Information
To better understand the implication of the information uncertainty and the effort
for market equilibrium and social welfare, in this section we first consider a baseline
GS model of NREE with information asymmetry, assuming that the fraction of the
informed λ is exogenously given.
3.1. The Securities. Concerning the investment decision, each trader maximizes
his expected utility conditional on his information set, i.e, E[u(W˜i)|Fi]. Let xi be
the number of shares trader i holds and P˜ be the price of the risky asset, then trader
i’s terminal wealth becomes
W˜i = xi(D˜ −RP˜ ) +Wi,0R, (3.1)
5At the equilibrium, expectations realize so that the fraction of informed, λ, exactly matches
the value expected by the traders when using the revealed vector of probabilities p∗. Finally, the
equilibrium price P ∗ will be consistent with the outcome of the game.
10
where Wi,0 is trader i’s initial wealth (assumed to be zero for simplicity). Since
dividend payoff is normally distributed, the standard solution for trader i’s optimal
holding of the risky asset is given by
x∗i =
E[D˜ −RP˜ |Fi]
αVar[D˜ −RP˜ |Fi]
. (3.2)
Informed traders observe both the signal and the price, hence Fi = {θ˜, P˜ ;λ} for
i = I (ωi = +1). Their optimal demand becomes
6
x∗I(θ, P ) =
E[D˜ −RP˜ |θ˜ = θ, P˜ = P ]
αVar[D˜ −RP˜ |θ˜ = θ, P˜ = P ] =
d+ θ −RP
αv
. (3.3)
For the uninformed traders, they observe only the price, i.e, Fi = {P˜ ;λ} for i = U
or ωi = 0. Their optimal demand is given by
x∗U(P ) =
E[D˜ −RP˜ |P˜ = P ]
αVar[D˜ −RP˜ |P˜ = P ] =
d+ E[θ˜|P˜ = P ]−RP
α(v + Var[θ˜|P˜ = P ])
, (3.4)
where, since θ˜ and P˜ are both normally distributed,
E[θ˜|P˜ = P ] = Cov[θ˜, P˜ ]
Var[P˜ ]
(P − E[P˜ ]), Var[θ˜|P˜ = P ] = (1− Corr[θ˜, P˜ ]2)vθ.
Evaluating the above requires the exact form of the price P˜ . Following the NREE
literature (Admati (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1987)), we postulate a linear price
P˜ =
1
R
(d+ bθθ˜ − bz z˜), (3.5)
where bθ(≥0) and bz(≥0) are determined in equilibrium. By inserting (3.5) into
(3.4) we obtain that
x∗U(P ) =
d−RP
α vU
, (3.6)
where
vU = Var[D˜|P˜ = P ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
dividend risk
+
β
1− βVar[D˜|P˜ = P ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
information risk
, β =
bθvθ
b2θvθ + b
2
zvz
.
One important observation from (3.6) is that the uninformed trader trades as if
his expected payoff is d − RP and the risk of his payoff is vU , which is made up
6Note that the optimal demand for both informed and uninformed do not explicitly depend on
i ∈ (0, 1), rather on the type of the agent.
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of two components: dividend risk and information risk. Intuitively, the uninformed
trader reduces his demand when price becomes more sensitive to the signal, which
is measured by bθ. In other words, the uninformed trader becomes unwilling (or
requires a larger risk premium) to trade when the price contains more information.
When bθ = 0 and thus Cov[θ˜, P˜ ] = 0, the aggregate risk faced by the uninformed
trader is the same as the unconditional variance of the dividend payoff, i.e., vU =
Var[D˜] = vθ + v since information risk disappears in this case. Therefore, price’s
sensitivity towards the signal, or price efficiency, has two offsetting effects; it reduces
dividend risk (conditional variance of dividend), but increases information risk. In
order to determine which effect dominates, we need to solve for the coefficients bθ
and bz in equilibrium, which we do next.
3.2. Equilibrium. Based on (3.3) and (3.4), the market clearing condition requires
that ∫ 1
0
x∗i di = λx
∗
I(θ, P ) + (1− λ)x∗U(P ) = z˜, (3.7)
where λ is the fraction of traders who are informed. The equilibrium price can be
characterized as follows.
Proposition 3.1. For given λ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique linear equilibrium price
of the risky asset,
P˜ =
1
R
(d+ bθθ˜ − bz z˜), (3.8)
where
bθ =
λv¯
v
, bz = αv¯, (3.9)
and
1
v¯
=
λ
v
+
1− λ
vU
, vU = v + vθ +
1
α
(
vθ
vz
)(
λ
αv
)
. (3.10)
Proposition 3.1 shows that the aggregate market risk, measured by v¯, is the har-
monic mean of the risk of informed v and uninformed vU weighted by their market
fractions λ and 1−λ, respectively. Also, the aggregate risk faced by the uninformed
traders, vU , is larger than the unconditional variance of the dividend. Intuitively, an
increase in the fraction of informed traders λ makes the price more sensitive to the
signal θ, which reduces dividend risk while increases information risk as per discus-
sion previousely. The expression of vU in (3.10) shows the former is dominated by
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the latter in equilibrium, thus the net effect is positive. Also, the effect is stronger
when the informed traders are less risk averse (and trader more aggressively), i.e., 1
α
increases, and when the information to noise ratio λ
αv
= bθ
bz
and the informativeness
of the information vθ
vz
are higher; both indicate a more informative price.
The fact that the aggregate risk faced by the uninformed traders can be larger
than the unconditional variance of the the dividend payoff, i.e., vU ≥ Var[D˜], has
important implication on aggregate market risk v¯ and the risk premium αv¯. First, we
investigate how an increase in informed trading λ can affect the aggregate risk and
risk premium. From (3.10), we can see that an increase in λ reduces the aggregate
risk v¯ more towards v, which is the risk faced by the informed traders, however, it
also increases information risk for the uninformed traders. The net effect of λ on
the aggregate risk is characterized as follows.
Corollary 3.2. On the aggregate risk v¯ (per unit of supply, that is 1
z
∂E[D˜−RP˜ |z˜=z]
∂λ
)
(i) when α ≥ α¯, it decreases in λ;
(ii) when α < α¯, it increases in λ if and only if λ < α2v2 v
2
zQ,
where α¯ = 1√
vz(v+vθ)
and
Q =
√
(1/vθ + 1/v)2 + vθvzv2 (1/α
2 − 1/α¯2)− (1/v + 1/vθ) > 0.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
λ
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
v
(A) Aggregate Risk
α=1 α=2 α=3 α=4 1 2 3 4
α
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
αv (B) Risk Premium
λ=0.02 λ=0.05 λ=0.08 λ=0.15
Figure 3.1. Relationship between aggregate risk v¯ and fraction of
informed traders λ in panel (A), and between risk premium αv¯ and
risk aversion α in panel (B).
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Corollary 3.2 shows that whether informed trading increases the aggregate risk
(per unit of supply) depends on traders’ risk aversion. Note that the aggregate risk
v¯ is larger in a market with all uninformed (λ = 0) than the one with all informed
(λ = 1). When traders are highly risk averse (α > α¯), informed trading always
reduces the risk premium. Intuitively, when traders are more risk averse, they trade
less aggressively. However more informed trading makes the price more informative,
which then reduces the aggregate risk. Note that α¯ decreases in the dividend noise
(v + vθ) and supply noise (vz), this becomes more pronounced when the dividend
and supply noises are large (so that α ≥ α¯).
When traders are less risk averse (α < α¯), there is a hump-shaped relation between
the aggregate risk (v¯) and the informed trading (λ). This means that, when there
are less informed traders in the market, the aggregate risk increases in the informed
trading; however the aggregate risk decreases when there are more informed traders.
This, somewhat unexpected, non-monotonic behavior is due to the information risk
component of uninformed risk. When α is small, vU is highly susceptible on shifts
in λ. Moreover, if λ is also small, uninformed are predominant on the market.
Therefore the impact of vU on the harmonic mean is higher compared to v. When
λ increases, this effect vanishes due to the shift of the weight towards the informed
fraction of the traders. The results are illustrated in Figure 3.1 (A) showing that
aggregate risk is significantly higher in market with a small fraction of informed
traders than in a market with either no informed trading or all informed trading.
For instance, for α = 1, the aggregate risk is more than triples when λ ≈ 0.075
(v¯ = 0.573) than in the case with λ = 0 (v¯ = 0.18). This becomes more pronounced
when the dividend and supply noises are small (so that α < α¯).
Moreover, quite remarkably, panel (B) shows that the risk premium αv¯ can in-
crease in the risk aversion when the risk aversion is either low or high. This inter-
esting phenomenon occurs because a reduction in α increases information risk faced
by uninformed traders, which dominates the net effect on the risk premium when
risk aversion is low and fraction of informed traders λ is small.7
7This interesting phenomenon occurs because, as seen before, when λ and α are both small the
information risk component takes comparatively large values which bump up the aggregate risk v¯.
Therefore, the natural monotonically increasing behavior of risk premium as a function of α suffers
14
3.3. Welfare. We now analyze trader i’s welfare and start by some preliminary
results related to expected utilities conditioned on the type. Using notations as in
(2.3) for VI(λ) and VU(λ), expressions for x
∗
I and x
∗
U as in (3.3) and (3.6) and the
linear equilibrium in Proposition 3.1, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.3. For given λ ∈ [0, 1], the welfare of each trader, conditional on
his type k ∈ {I, U}, is given by
Vk(λ) = − 1√
1 + ξk(λ)
, ξk(λ) =
Var
[
E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fk
]]
Var
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fk
] , (3.11)
where
ξI(λ) =
(1− bθ)2vθ + b2zvz
v
, ξU(λ) =
(1− β)2(b2θvθ + b2zvz)
v + (1− βbθ)vθ .
Also, VI(λ) > VU(λ).
Proposition 3.3 shows that traders’ welfare increases with the variance of the
conditional expectation of excess return of the risky asset, i.e., D˜−RP˜ , and decreases
with the conditional variance of excess return. Intuitively, the ratio between the two
aforementioned quantities determines the aggressiveness of the traders’ portfolios
and thus, their expected utilities. Proposition 3.3 also shows that, if information is
costless, every trader would choose to become informed, i.e., λ = 1. However, as we
show in the next corollary, having all traders to be informed does not collectively
maximize their overall welfare.
Corollary 3.4. Each trader i’s expected utility in a market with only informed
traders (λ = 1) and in a market with only uninformed traders (λ = 0) are given by
respectively,
VI(1) = − 1√
1 + α2vvz
(3.12)
and
VU(0) = − 1√
1 + α2(v + vθ)vz
, (3.13)
a sort of transient bull in the risk premium, observable only for small values of λ and in the region
where α is positive but not too large.
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Corollary 3.4 implies that the overall welfare of all traders is actually higher when
they are all uninformed (λ = 0) than when they are all informed (λ = 1), which
may seem counter-intuitive since traders are always better off to be informed than
uninformed. As a textbook example, consider the case where we just have two
players and, for simplicity, information is costless (players may decide their state).
Fixing all the relevant parameters equal to one; v = vθ = vz = α = 1, we obtain
VU(0.5) < VI(1) < VU(0) < VI(0.5), where λ = 0.5 accounts for the situation where
the two players choose a different action. Eventually, the normal-form game has a
payoff matrix as in Table 1, which is evidently a Prisoner’s dilemma situation.
I U
I -0.70; -0.70 -0.56; -0.76
U -0.76; -0.56 -0.57; -0.57
Table 1. Two-player payoff matrix.
The resulting Prisoner’s dilemma illustrates a situation in which traders fail to
coordinate towards the best outcome (represented by VU(0)) and came up with a
socially less preferable Nash equilibrium.
To see why VI(1) < VU(0), note that as λ increases, price becomes more sensitive
to the signal, i.e, bθ increases. When λ = 1, we obtain that d + θ˜ − RP˜ = αvz˜.
Therefore, the informed traders are only compensated by the risk premium since the
information they receive have been fully reflected by the equilibrium price, i.e., bθ =
1. On the other hand, when λ = 0, which would be the outcome when information
is extremely costly, the price is uninformative since bθ = 0. Therefore, traders are
compensated by the risk premium, i.e, d − RP˜ = α(v + vz)z˜, which is however
larger than in the case of λ = 1, because traders perceive a larger dividend risk,
thus a larger price discount is required. Furthermore, we can show that ξ′i(λ) < 0
for i ∈ {I, U} and ξ′I(λ) − ξ′U(λ) < 0, from which we have the following result on
the welfare change.
Corollary 3.5. For λ ∈ (0, 1), the welfare of both informed and uninformed traders
is decreasing in λ. In addition, the difference between their welfare is also decreasing
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in λ, i.e.,
d
dλ
Vk(λ) < 0, k ∈ {I, U} and d
dλ
(VI(λ)− VU(λ)) < 0. (3.14)
Corollary 3.5 provides further insight into the result in Corollary 3.4. It implies
that the welfare of both informed and uninformed traders is decreasing in the in-
formed trading. Therefore more informed trading is harmful for traders’ welfare.
More interestingly, with informed trading, the welfare is reducing faster for the in-
formed than for the uninformed, meaning that the informed trading is more harmful
for the informed than for the uninformed traders. Let social welfare be defined as
the weighted average of traders’ welfare.8
U(λ) = λVI(λ) + (1− λ)VU(λ), (3.15)
then we have
U ′(λ) = (VI(λ)− VU(λ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
+
d
dλ
VU(λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
+ λ
d
dλ
(VI(λ)− VU(λ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
. (3.16)
Therefore, informed trading improves the average welfare only when the welfare
difference between the informed and uninformed traders is large enough, which is
more likely to occur when λ is small and the price is less informative. Furthermore,
we can obtain the necessary and sufficient condition for the social welfare to be
increasing when the informed trading level is very low (λ ≈ 0).
Corollary 3.6. In market populated by uninformed traders, i.e., λ ≈ 0, the social
welfare is increasing in λ, i.e., limλ→0 U ′(λ) > 0 if and only if
1+
α2vz
v
(v2 −v2θ) >
1
1 + vθ
v
√
(1 + α2vz(v + vθ))
(
1 +
vθ
v
+
vz
v
α2(v + vθ)2
)
(3.17)
Corollary 3.6 shows that, in the case where vθ/v = 1, the average welfare U(λ) is
more likely to increase in λ when the noise supply vz or risk aversion α is small. In
fact, in the limits of either vz → 0 or α→ 0, condition (3.17) reduces to 1 + vθv > 1,
which always holds.
8In this section, we set µ = 0 since the fraction of informed is exogensously given and the
information game is not explicitly modeled. In Section 4 we provide a general version of the social
welfare where the cost of effort µ c(p) is taken into account.
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Figure 3.2. Percentage change in welfare 1− U(λ)U(0) as a function of
λ. Parameter values are given by {v = 1, vθ = 1, vz = 0.12} in panel
(A) and {v = 1, vθ = 1, vz = 1} in panel (B).
In Figure 3.2, we plot the percentage change in the welfare or the relative social
welfare, define by 1 − U(λ)U(0) (since U(λ) < 0). We have the following observations.
First, Panel (A) shows that when vz is relatively small, there is initially a welfare
improvement when λ is small, which gradually diminishes as λ increases and becomes
negative when λ becomes large. However, the hump shape weakens when traders
become more risk averse, consistent with Corollary 3.6. Second, Panel (B) shows
that, when vz is relatively large, informed trading always leads to a welfare loss,
which monotonically decreases with the fraction of informed traders λ.
In summary, when λ is given exogenously, a small to moderate amount of informed
trading (depending on traders’ risk aversion and information structure with respect
to vθ, v and vz) could be welfare improving when the informed trading results in
a large difference in the welfare between informed and uninformed traders, which
is shown to be the case as long as the noise in supply is small enough. Otherwise,
informed trading always reduces the welfare. Therefore, how informed trading affects
the welfare depending on market fraction of informed traders. With the information
uncertainty and disutility of the effort, the market fraction of informed traders is
determined endogenously by the trade off between the utility of being informed and
the disutility of the effort. This leads to the endogenous information equilibrium to
be explored in the following section.
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4. Endogenous Informed Trading and Social Welfare
In the previous section, we have taken λ as an exogenous parameter, i.e., a certain
proportion of the traders are born as informed and the rest are born as uninformed.
In this section, we allow traders to play the strategic information game, whose
outcome is a Nash equilibrium p∗, corresponding to λ∗, hence the equilibrium price
P ∗.
4.1. Endogenous Information Equilbrium. As already discussed in Section 2,
each trader optimally chooses a probability, pi ∈ [p0, 1], to be informed (about θ˜).
To model the information game, we rely on the payoff structure as in (2.2), inspired
by probabilistic choice models. It remains to specify the cost function c and to
analyze in details the equilibrium information acquisition of the game. To this aim,
we set
c(p) =
∫ p
p0
g(t) dt, (4.1)
where the marginal cost of effort, g(t) = c′(t), is positive and increasing.9 Therefore,
the first order condition related to (2.2) suggests that p∗i solves
g(p∗i ) = h(λ) ≡
1
µ
(VI(λ)− VU(λ)) . (4.2)
First of all, since h(λ) is independent from i, at the equilibrium, we have p∗i = p
∗
for all i ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is symmetric. Moreover, at the
information acquisition equilibrium,
λ∗ =
∫ 1
0
p∗i di = p
∗, (4.3)
which shows that the fraction of informed emerging at the equilibrium coincides
with the probability of the (representative) agent to become informed. Therefore,
we can rewrite the first order condition (4.2) in terms of the unique variable λ (from
now on, we write λ in place of λ∗):
g(λ) = h(λ).
9Note that, c(p0) = 0 meaning that, in general, even if traders make no effort, they can still
become informed purely by chance with a probability of po.
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Furthermore, since g′(λ) > 0 and h′(λ) < 0, we have a unique equilibrium λ for p0 <
λ < 1 when g(0) < h(0) and g(1) > h(1). In summary, the following proposition
characterizes the endogenous information and noise rational expectation equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1. With the disutility function (4.1), if g(λ) is positive and in-
creasing and h(λ) is defined by (4.2) for λ ∈ [p0, 1] satisfying g(p0) < h(p0) and
g(1) > h(1), then there exists a unique equilibrium price P˜ and equilibrium market
fraction of informed traders λ satisfying (3.8) and g(λ) = h(λ), respectively, where
the parameters bθ and bz defined in (3.9) and (3.10) are evaluated at the equilibrium
λ.
When considering the information uncertain and disutility of the effort in a more
general setup, Mattsson and Weibull (2002) show that the only rational choice for
the disutility function is given by the entropic cost function,
c(p) = p ln
p
p0
+ (1− p) ln 1− p
1− p0 , (4.4)
which implies that the marginal cost g reads
g(p) = ln
p
1− p − ln
p0
1− p0 .
Since g(p0) = 0 < h(p0) and limp→1 g(p) = +∞, all assumptions of Proposition 4.1
are met. The unique equilibrium λ ∈ (p0, 1) is determined by
λ = g−1(h(λ)) =
p0
p0 + (1− p0)e−h(λ) ,
which is equivalent to the discrete choice model with a choice intensity of µ (see, for
instance, Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992)). This provides the microfounda-
tion for the effort function (4.4) in the following analysis on the price efficiency first
and then the social welfare.
4.2. Equilibrium Informed Trading and Price Efficiency. With the closed
form endogenous information equilibrium, we can numerically analyze the implica-
tions for the equilibrium informed trading and price informativeness. To be con-
sistent with the GS model, we examine the impact from three aspects: the noise
in supply vz; the informativeness of the signal vθ/v (keeping v + vθ constant);
and the dividend risk v + vθ (keeping vθ/v constant). Unless specified otherwise,
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the analysis is based on the reference probability of becoming informed p0 = 0.1
and variance parameters vz = 0.1
2 and vθ = v = 1. Figure 4.1 plots the impact
on the equilibrium fraction of informed traders, λ, and the price informativeness,
ρ ≡ Corr(P˜ , θ˜).
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Figure 4.1. Impact of noise in supply vz, dividend risk vθ + v and
signal informativeness vθ/v on fraction of informed traders λ in Panel
A and price informativeness ρ ≡ Corr(P˜ , θ˜) in Panel B.
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On the effect of the supply noise, Figure 4.1 (A1) and (B1) lead to the following
observations.
(i) The price informativeness ρ = Corr(P˜ , θ˜) decreases monotonically in the
supply noise vz, illustrated in plot (B1). This implies that high noise in the
supply always reduces the price efficiency.
(ii) On the equilibrium fraction of informed traders λ, in contrary to the GS
model (Conjecture 5), it does not monotonically increase with the noise
supply (vz), illustrated in plot (A1), unless traders are very risk averse (α ≤
1).10
(iii) When traders are less risk averse (α ≤ 1), they trade more aggressively,
which increases the benefit of being informed, so traders make more effort
to becoming informed. This is consistent with the GS model (Conjecture 5).
Interestingly, in this case, more effort is actually reducing price efficiency,
which is however inconsistent with the GS model (Conjecture 1). Therefore,
when traders are less risk averse, more informed trading is harmful for price
efficiency.
(iv) When the supply noise is large enough and traders are more risk averse
(α > 1), the equilibrium fraction of informed trading is decreasing in the
noise supply. This result goes opposite to the GS model (Conjecture 5).
Intuitively, with large supply noise, price becomes less informative. When
traders are more risk averse (α > 1), they trade less aggressively, which
limits the benefit of being informed. Therefore traders make less effort to
becoming informed.
(v) When the supply noise is small and traders are more risk averse, we observe
a hump-shaped relation between the fraction of informed and the supply
noise. This means that the information becomes more valuable (so that
traders are making more effort to becoming informed) when the noise in the
supply is neither too small nor too large. Intuitively, when the supply noise
10This is due to the fact that, in the GS model, λ is determined by the ratio
E[u∗(W˜I)|λ]
E[u∗(W˜U)|λ] rather
than the difference E
[
u∗
(
W˜I
)
|λ
]
−E
[
u∗
(
W˜U
)
|λ
]
. As it turns out, the ratio is increasing in vz
whereas the difference follows a hump shape when traders are not too risk averse.
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is too small, the price becomes more informative, reducing the informative
advantage to becoming informed. On the other hand, when the supply noise
is too large, the price becomes less informative, reducing trading of unin-
formed traders and hence the informative advantage to becoming informed.
The hump shaped relationship between λ and vz, and the reduction of the
price informativeness in vz are more pronounced when traders are more risk
averse and the supply noise is very low, leading price to be less efficient even
when traders make more effort. In the limit when there is no noise, traders
make no effort to become informed (except with the default probability of
p0). This is consistent with the GS model (Conjecture 6)
In summary, whether traders make more effort to become informed and hence im-
proves price efficiency depends on the size of noisy supply and traders’ risk aversion.
When traders are less risk averse, as the supply noise increases, traders make more
effort to become informed but the price becomes less efficient. When traders are
more risk averse, an increase in the supply noise at low levels leads to more effort for
traders to become informed, which however does not improve the price efficiency;
more generally, an increase in the supply noise at high levels always leads traders
to make less effort to becoming informed, making price less efficient. Therefore in-
formed trading improves price efficiency in general, but this is nor necessarily always
the case.
On the effect of the dividend risk v + vθ, Figure 4.1 (A2) and (B2) lead to the
following observation.
(vi) With an increase in the dividend risk, traders are making more effort to be
informed but the price becomes less efficient; in contrary to the GS model
(Conjecture 1). Intuitively, when dividend becomes more noisy, traders are
making more effort to becoming informed, which improves the price effi-
ciency. However, such improvement is dominated by the increasing dividend
noise, resulting price to be less efficient. The effect becomes more significant
when traders become more risk averse and the dividend is less noisy.
On the effect of the informativeness of the signal vθ/v, Figure 4.1 (A3) and (B3)
illustrate the following result.
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(vii) With an increase in the informativeness, traders are making more effort to be
informed so that price becomes more informative. However, when the infor-
mation becomes too informative for traders, their marginal effort to becom-
ing informed is reducing, thought price efficiency still improves marginally.
Intuitively, improving price efficiency and the informativeness of the infor-
mation reduce the information advantage and hence traders’ incentive top
make effort. The effect become more significant when traders become more
risk averse. More interestingly, the increase in the informed trading cannot
perfectly offset the increase in the noise (in supply and in dividend), which
is different from the GS model.
Overall, when the noise in the information is neither too small nor too large
relative to the noise supply and the unobserved noise, the information becomes
more valuable and traders make more effort to becoming informed. However more
effort does not necessarily make the price to be more efficient.
4.3. Equilibrium Social Welfare. We now examine the impact on the social wel-
fare U(λ) and the relative social welfare 1 − U(λ)/U(p0). The results are reported
in Fig. 4.2 with respect to the noise in supply vz (Panels (A1) and (B1)), the infor-
mativeness of the signal vθ/v (Panels (A2) and (B2)), and the dividend risk v + vθ
(Panels (A3) and (B3)), as in Fig. 4.1. They lead to the following results.
(viii) The social welfare increases in the supply noise and dividend noise, but
decreases in the informativeness of the signal, as illustrated in the left panels
of Fig. 4.2. Comparing to the right panels of Fig. 4.1, we observe a negative
relation between the price efficiency and social welfare. This implies that the
social welfare is always low when price becomes more efficient.
(ix) Quite remarkably, regardless the change in the social welfare U(λ), the rela-
tive social welfare is always negative with respect to the supply noise, divi-
dend risk, and informativeness of the signal, as illustrated in the right panels
in Fig. 4.2. This implies that making effort always reduces the social welfare
comparing to making no effort. This is underlined by the Prisoner’s dilemma
discussed in the previous section, also in contrast to Figure 3.2, where the
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Figure 4.2. Impact of noise in supply vz, dividend risk vθ + v and
signal informativeness vθ/v on traders’ welfare U(λ) in Panel A and
relative welfare 1− U(λ)/U(p0) in Panel B.
relative social welfare can be positive and increasing in λ when λ is given
exogenously.
(x) The relative welfare decreases in the dividend noise and the informativeness
of the signal, but the effect is ambiguous about the change in the supply noise,
as illustrated in the right panels of Fig. 4.2. This means that the relative
social welfare of making effort comparing to making no effort becomes even
worse with high dividend noise and informativeness of the signal. When
traders are less risk averse (α ≤ 1), the relative welfare decreases in the noisy
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supply. However, when traders are more risk averse (α > 1), it decreases
quickly and then increases in the noisy supply. This effect becomes more
significant when traders are very risk averse. Therefore, when traders are
more risk averse, high noisy supply helps to improve the relative welfare
of making effort, though still below the welfare of making no effort. More
interestingly, comparing the right panels of Fig. 4.2 to the left panels of Fig.
4.1, we also observe a negative relation between the equilibrium fraction
of informed traders and the relative social welfare. This implies that the
relative social welfare is always low when traders make more effort.
Therefore, our findings suggest that improving market efficiency is always at the
cost of reducing the social welfare. Also, when traders make effort to reduce their
uncertainty on being informed, this is always harmful to the social welfare relative
to the benchmark in which traders make no effort. Intuitively, when λ is given
exogenously, an initial increase in λ from zero can improve traders’ welfare if VI(λ)−
VU(λ) is large enough. However, when the disutility of the effort is considered, in
equilibrium this gain in the social welfare is perfectly offset by the disutility µ c(λ).
In fact, from the FOC
VI(λ)− VU(λ) = µc′(λ). (4.5)
Thus it is no longer possible to improve welfare from U(p0), which is the limiting
case when µ→∞. If we take the disutility into account and redefine the modified
social welfare V(λ) as
V(λ) = U(λ)− µc(λ),
we can observe from (3.16) and (4.5) the following result.
Corollary 4.2. In equilibrium, the modified social utility V(λ) is always decreasing
in λ.
Furthermore, we show in Figure 4.3 the relationship between the disutility of the
effort, µc(λ), for each trader, in (A), the relative welfare 1 − U(λ)/U(p0) in (B)
and the cost coefficient µ.11 Based on Figure 4.3 (A), the disutility is a decreasing
function of µ except when µ is very low (µ ≈ 0). Also more risk averse traders
11Being now λ endogenous, in both c(λ) and U(λ) we are implicitly assuming that λ = λ(µ).
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Figure 4.3. Impact of cost sensitivity µ on total utility cost of
effort µ c(λ) in Panel A and relative welfare 1− U(λ)/U(p0) in Panel
B.
tend to exert more effort to obtain information. Intuitively, traders need to make
more effort when µ is relatively high. However, a higher µ also leads to a lower λ
since traders optimally choose a lower p∗i . Our finding shows that the latter effect
dominates in determining µ c(λ) except when µ is close to zero. Based on Figure
4.3 (B), the relative welfare is mostly negative when traders exert most effort, i.e.,
when µ c(λ) is the highest. Therefore, when traders spent more effort to becoming
informed, this actually makes them worse off in terms of their overall welfare.
5. Modelling Trading Motives Explicitly
In this section, rather assuming noise in supply, we follow Bond and Garc´ıa (2017)
explicitly to motivate trading using endowment shocks.
Each trader i, i ∈ {I, U}, receives an endowment, eiD˜, at the end of the trading
period. Thus, trader i’s terminal wealth is given by12
W˜i = (xi + ei)(D˜ − P˜ ) + eiP˜ . (5.1)
We assume that ei is known to trader i, but not known to other traders. Moreover
ei = z˜+ u˜i, where z˜ ∼ N (0, vz) is an aggregate endowment shock and u˜i ∼ N (0, vu)
12For simplicity, we assume the the payoff of the risk-free asset, R = 1.
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is an idiosyncratic shock. Therefore, trader i’s optimal portfolio is given by
x∗i =
E
[
D˜ − P˜ |Fi
]
αVar
[
D˜ − P˜ |Fi
] − ei, (5.2)
where the information set for the informed and uninformed traders are given by
Fi∈I = {θ, P, ei} and Fi∈U = {P, ei} respectively. We conjecture that equilibrium
price has the following form,
P˜ = d+ bθθ˜ − bz z˜. (5.3)
If trader i is uninformed, his own endowment shock ei provides additional informa-
tion about the dividend payoff D˜ since ei is positively correlated with the aggregate
endowment shock z˜. Thus, the optimal portfolio for an uninformed trader is given
by
x∗i∈U =
(
1− βP,D
1−ρ2ei,P
)
(d− P )− βei,P βP,D
1−ρ2ei,P
ei
α
(
1− ρ
2
P,D
1−ρ2ei,P
)
(v + vθ)
− ei, (5.4)
where βX,Y ≡ Cov[X, Y ]/Var[X] and ρX,Y ≡ Corr[X, Y ], and the optimal portfolio
for an informed trader is given by
x∗i∈I =
d+ θ − P
αv
− ei. (5.5)
Since we assume the risky asset is in zero net supply, market clearing requires∫ 1
0
λx∗i∈I + (1− λ)x∗i∈Udi = 0,
where λ is the fraction of informed traders.
As before, we are interested in the impact of informed on the overall welfare of
the traders. First, we consider two special cases where λ = 0 and λ = 1. We define
ξi(λ) ≡
Var
[
E
[
D˜ − P˜ |Fi
]]
Var
[
D˜ − P˜ |Fi
]
as a profitability measure of trader i’s portfolio, which depends on the fraction
of informed traders λ. Note that for λ = 0, the equilibrium price becomes P˜ =
d−α(vθ + v)z˜ and trader i’s optimal portfolio is x∗i∈U = d−Pα(vθ+v) − ei. On the other
hand, when λ = 1, the equilibrium price and trader i’s optimal portfolio are given
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by P˜ = d+ θ − αv and x∗i∈I = d+θ−Pαv − ei. The following proposition characterizes
traders’ overall welfare.
Proposition 5.1. The welfare of trader i is given by
E
[
u(W˜i∈U)|ei
]
= − exp
{
−αei d+ 1
2
e2i
vz
ξi∈U(0)
}(
1 +
vu
vz
ξi∈U(0)
)−1/2
(5.6)
when λ = 0, where ξi∈U(0) = α2(vθ + v)vz, and
E
[
u(W˜i∈I)|ei
]
= − exp
{
−αei d+ 1
2
e2i
vz
ξi∈U(0)
}(
1 +
vu
vz
ξi∈I(1)
)−1/2
(5.7)
when λ = 1, where ξi∈I(1) = α2vvz.
Proposition 5.1 shows that, given the same endowment shock ei, informed trading
incurs a welfare cost due to the reduction in the profitability measure ξ. Note that,
when ei = 0, we recover the results in Corollary 3.4.
6. Conclusion
With growing population, economy and technological innovations, we have wit-
nessed increasing uncertainty and complexity in financial markets. Traders become
more uncertain on multidimensional information and need to make some effort to
reduce their uncertainty on certain information. We expect that such effort would
improve traders’ welfare as well as price efficiency. However such effort is associ-
ated with disutility; the more the effort, the high the disutility. In this paper we
consider traders’ effort to being informed and the disutility of their effort in an oth-
erwise standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model. In a baseline model with no
uncertainty (and hence no effort), we show that informed trading improves prices
efficiency, but reduces the social welfare in general, resulting a Prisoner’s dilemma
situation; the social welfare would be better off if nobody is informed but individual
is rationally driven to being informed. When the disutility of the effort is taken
into account, we are able to characterize the endogenous information equilibrium
of the non-cooperative information game on traders’ decision of making effort by a
Nash equilibrium and asset price by a noisy rational expectation equilibrium. We
show that making effort to be informed is harmful for social welfare and improving
market efficiency is always at the cost of reducing the welfare. Therefore, with the
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disutility of making effort, social welfare can be improved when traders make less
effort and social welfare and price efficiency cannot be improved simultaneously.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1: We substitute the linear equilibrium price in (3.5) into
traders’ optimal demand functions in (3.3) and (3.4) respectively, from which we
obtain
x∗I(θ, P ) =
d+ θ −RP
αv
(A.1)
and
x∗U(P ) =
(
1− bθvθ
b2θvθ+b
2
zvz
)
(d−RP )
α
(
v +
b2zvz
b2θvθ+b
2
zvz
vθ
) (A.2)
Then, by applying the market clearing condition,
λx∗I(θ, P ) + (1− λ)x∗U(P ) = z˜
we obtain the following equilibrium price,
P˜ =
1
R

λ
v
(d+ θ˜) +
(1−λ)
(
1− bθvθ
b2
θ
vθ+b
2
zvz
)
v+
b2zvz
b2
θ
vθ+b
2
zvz
vθ
d− αz˜
λ
v
+
(1−λ)
(
1− bθvθ
b2
θ
vθ+b
2
zvz
)
v+
b2zvz
b2
θ
vθ+b
2
zvz
vθ

=
1
R
(
d+
λv¯
v
θ˜ − αv¯z˜
)
, (A.3)
where
1
v¯
=
λ
v
+
(1− λ)
(
1− bθvθ
b2θvθ+b
2
zvz
)
v +
b2zvz
b2θvθ+b
2
zvz
vθ
.
Thus, by matching coefficient to the conjectured equilibrium price in (3.5), we obtain
bθ =
λv¯
v
and bz = αv¯.
Therefore, since bθ = λbz/(αv), we obtain an explicit solution for v¯ by solving
λ
v
+
(1− λ)
(
1− (λbz/α) vθ/v
(λbz/α)2vθ/v2+b
2
zvz
)
v +
b2zvz
(λbz/α)2vθ/v2+b
2
zvz
vθ
=
bz
α
for bz and substituting the solution back into the expression for 1/v¯.
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Proof of Corollary 3.2: The risk premium per unit of supply is given by 1
z
E[D˜ −
RP˜ |z˜ = z] = αv¯. For convenience, we let αθ = 1/vθ, α = 1/v and αz = 1/vz, hence
(3.10) can be rewritten as
1
v¯
= λα + (1− λ) ααθ
αθ + α + λA
where A = αzα
2
/α
2. Then
∂(1/v¯)
∂λ
=
α
[αθ + α + λA]2
{[λA+ αθ + α]2 − [α2θ + αθα + αθA]}. (A.4)
Therefore ∂(1/v¯)
∂λ
≥ 0 if and only if
λA ≥
√
α2θ + αθα + αθA− [αθ + α] := Q
Note that Q ≥ 0 if and only if 1/α2 ≥ (1/αz)[1/α + 1/αθ]. Therefore, when
1/α2 < (1/αz)[1/α + 1/αθ],
∂(1/v¯)
∂λ
> 0, meaning that the risk premium decreases
in λ. Otherwise, when 1/α2 ≥ (1/αz)[1/α + αθ], the risk premium increases in λ if
and only if λ < Q/A.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: First, compute trader i’s expected utility given their in-
formation set Fi, which yields (since wealth W˜i is normally distributed)
E
[
u(W˜i)|Fi
]
= − exp
{
−α
(
E
[
W˜i|Fi
]
− 1
2
αVar
[
W˜i|Fi
])}
= − exp
{
−α
(
x∗iE
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fi
]
− 1
2
α(x∗i )
2Var
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fi
])}
= − exp
−12
(
E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fi
])2
Var
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fi
]
 . (A.5)
For the informed,
Var
[
D˜ −RP˜ | FI
]
= Var
[
D˜ −RP˜ |P˜ = P, θ˜ = θ] = v, (A.6)
and
E[D˜ −RP˜ |FI ] = d+ θ −RP = (1− bθ)θ − bzz.
Therefore,
Var
[
E[D˜ −RP˜ |P˜ = P, θ˜ = θ]] = Var [(1− bθ)θ − bzz] = (1− bθ)2vθ + b2zvz. (A.7)
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For the uninformed
Var
[
D˜−RP˜ | FU
]
= Var
[
D˜−RP˜ |P˜ = P ] = v+(1−Corr[θ˜, P˜ ]2)vθ == v+(1−βbθ)vθ,
and
E[D˜ −RP˜ |P˜ = P ] = (1− β)(d−RP ) = (1− β)(−bθθ − bzz).
where we used the fact that d−RP = d− (d+ bθθ + bzz). Therefore,
Var
[
E[D˜−RP˜ |P˜ = P ]] = Var [(1− β)(−bθθ − bzz)] = (1−β)2(b2θvθ+b2zvz). (A.8)
Based on the above results, we obtain the expressions for ξI(λ) and ξU(λ).
Next, since the conditional expectation E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fi
]
itself is a normally dis-
tributed random variable for both informed and uninformed traders, we can use
following standard result to compute trader i’s unconditional expected utility.
Lemma A.1. Let X ∈ Rn be a normally distributed random vector with mean µ
and variance-covariance matrix Σ. Let b ∈ Rn be a given vector, and A ∈ Rn×n a
symmetric matrix. If I − 2ΣA is positive definite, then E [exp{b>X +X>AX}] is
well defined, and given by
E
[
exp{b>X +X>AX}] =|I − 2ΣA|−1/2 exp{b>µ+ µ>Σµ
+
1
2
(b+ 2Aµ)>(I − 2ΣA)−1Σ(b+ 2Aµ)}.
Applying Lemma A.1 to the conditional expected utility in (A.5) withX = E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fi
]
,
A = −1
2
(Var
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fi
]
)−1, Σ = Var
[
E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fi
]]
, b = 0, µ = 0 leads to
the desired result.
It is straightforward to show that welfare is higher for the informed than for the
uninformed traders, i.e., E[u∗(W˜I)] ≥ E[u∗(W˜U)], since by the law of total variance,
Var
[
E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |θ˜, P˜
]]
= Var
[
D˜ −RP˜
]
− E
[
Var
[
D˜ −RP˜ |θ˜, P˜
]]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
v
,
Var
[
E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |P˜
]]
= Var
[
D˜ −RP˜
]
− E
[
Var
[
D˜ −RP˜ |P˜
]]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
v+
(
1−Corr[θ˜,P˜ ]2
)
vθ
,
Var
[
E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |θ˜, P˜
]]
− Var
[
E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |P˜
]]
=
(
1− Corr
[
θ˜, P˜
]2)
vθ ≥ 0.
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Proof of Corollary 3.4: When all traders are informed, λ = 1 and the equilibrium
price becomes P˜ = 1/R(d + θ˜ − αvz˜). Moreover, traders’ conditional expectation
and variance of the excess return are given by
E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |θ˜, P˜
]
= d+ θ −RP = αvz˜ and Var
[
D˜ −RP˜ |θ˜, P˜
]
= v.
Substituting the above into (3.11) leads to (3.12).
On the other hand, when all traders are uninformed, i.e., λ = 0, the equilib-
rium price becomes P˜ = 1/R(d− α(vθ + v)z˜), traders’ conditional expectation and
variance of the excess return are given by
E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |P˜
]
= d−RP = α(vθ + v)z˜ and Var
[
D˜ −RP˜ |P˜
]
= vθ + v.
Substituting the above into (3.11) leads to (3.13).
Proof of Corollary 3.6: Using the definition of the weighted average of traders’
welfare in (3.15), we can obtain
U ′(0) =
v(v + vθ) + vz(v − vθ)(v + vθ)2α2 − v2
√
(1+vz(v+vθ)α2)(v+vθ+vz(v+vθ)α2)
v
v(v + vθ) (1 + vz(v + vθ)α2)
3/2
,
which simplifies to the condition in (3.17).
Proof of Proposition 5.1: When λ = 0, the equilibrium price is given by P˜ =
d− α(v + vθ)z˜ and trader i’s optimal demand becomes
x∗i∈U =
d− P
α(v + vθ)
− ei. (A.9)
Thus, from (5.1), the conditional expectation and variance of trader i’s terminal
wealth are given by
E
[
W˜i∈U |P˜ , ei
]
=
(d− P )2
α(v + vθ)
+ eiP and Var
[
W˜i∈U |P˜ , ei
]
=
(d− P )2
α2(v + vθ)
,
(A.10)
respectively. Therefore, trader i’s conditional expected utility is given by
E
[
u
(
W˜i∈U
)
|P˜ , ei
]
= − exp
{
−1
2
(d− P )2
(v + vθ)
− α eiP
}
. (A.11)
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Since P˜ is normally distributed, we can use Lemma A.1 to compute E
[
u
(
W˜i∈U
)
|ei
]
,
which leads to (5.6).
On the other hand, when λ = 1, price becomes P˜ = d + θ˜ − αvz˜ and x∗i∈I =
(d+ θ − P )/(αv)− ei, thus we have
E
[
W˜i∈I |P˜ , θ˜, ei
]
=
(d+ θ − P )2
αv
+eiP and Var
[
W˜i∈I |P˜ , θ, ei
]
=
(d+ θ − P )2
α2v
,
(A.12)
and
E
[
u
(
W˜i∈I
)
|P˜ , θ˜, ei
]
= − exp
{
−1
2
(d+ θ − P )2
v
− α eiP
}
. (A.13)
Since P˜ and θ˜ are both normally distributed, Lemma A.1 can help us to compute
E
[
u
(
W˜i∈I
)
|ei
]
.
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